diff --git a/2024/documents/by-course/phil-1/paper-2/main.typ b/2024/documents/by-course/phil-1/paper-2/main.typ index 6d6f007..41baabe 100644 --- a/2024/documents/by-course/phil-1/paper-2/main.typ +++ b/2024/documents/by-course/phil-1/paper-2/main.typ @@ -43,9 +43,13 @@ = Introduction -The argument Against Fearing Death proposes the surprising thesis that you -should not fear being dead because it is not bad for you. The author states it -as follows on #cite(, supplement: [p. 74]): +The argument Against Fearing Death says that you should not fear being dead +because it is not bad for you. In this paper, I reject this thesis by showing +that the argument from hedonism with which the author supports their premises +forces us to draw incorrect conclusions. + +The author states the argument against fearing death as follows on +#cite(, supplement: [p. 74]): #indented-argument( title: "Against Fearing Death", @@ -57,22 +61,125 @@ as follows on #cite(, supplement: [p. 74]): [ So, you should not fear death ], ) -To support premise FD2, the author argues +First off, the author does not argue that you should not fear the _process_ of +dying. A painful death is something to be rationally feared. The author only +argues that _being dead_ itself is not bad. That is, you may fear the way by +which you die, but you should not fear the state of being dead itself. +Furthermore, if there was a high likelihood you may die painlessly, perhaps +under anesthesia during a risky surgery, you should not fear that either, as +you will painlessly transition from being alive to being dead, and there is +nothing to fear about being dead. + +The author justifies FD1 by denying the only possibility of rejecting it, which +is the notion that your consciousness continues after the death of your +physical body, perhaps in an afterlife. He rejects this idea by arguing that +you, the consciousness reading this, and your physical human body, are one and +the same (i.e. they are _numerically equivalent_). So, if your physical human +body biologically ceases to be conscious after death (which it does), then you +also cease to be conscious when you die. + +Premise FD3 is the direct result of FD1 and FD2, so its validity is dependent +entirely on FD1 and FD2. We've already shown why FD1 should be accepted. Let us +first examine FD4 before returning to FD2. + +FD4 makes a lot of intuitive sense. Indeed, upon close inspection, there are no +glaring issues. It is rational to fear something if and only if it is bad for +you. Sure, you may fear things that are not bad for you, but these fears are +_irrational_, you should try to resist them. The only things that it is +rational to fear are things that are actually bad for you, such as burning your +hand on a hot stove, or stubbing your toe. + +Finally, we return to premise FD2. This is perhaps the most questionable +premise as it is not immediately clear why being unconscious implies that being +dead is not bad. + +We first need a rigorous account of what exactly characterizes something as +"bad." The author defines the following hedonist principle: + +#pad( + left: 16pt, + [ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in + more pain than you would otherwise have had ], +) + +Then, he constructs the following #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] to support +FD2. + +#indented-argument( + title: "The Argument from Hedonism", + abbreviation: "AH", + [ + If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead doesn't result in more pain than you otherwise would have had + ], + [ + Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had + ], + [ + $<==>$ (FD2) So, if you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn't bad for you + ], +) + +I've slightly modified the author's numberings to emphasize that the conclusion +AH3 is equivalent to the premise FD2. That is, if the #smallcaps[Argument from +Hedonism] holds, then FD2 must be true. + +We've shown that the author's argument for why you should not fear death is +substantiated by what appear to be valid premises. I object in section 2 by +arguing that we should _not_ accept the author's hedonist principle, and +therefore should not accept premise FD2, because it leads us to the conclusion +that we should kill ourselves. In section 3, I address various potential +responses to my objection. = Don't kill yourself +I will advance the argument that we should reject HD\* because its logical +conclusion is that you should kill yourself. HD\* implies that being dead is +not bad for you, but it also implies that _being alive_ is bad for you. + #indented-argument( title: "Argument for Killing Yourself", abbreviation: "KYS", - [You are conscious when you are alive], - [Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had], + [You are occasionally conscious when you are alive], [If you are conscious, you experience more pain than you otherwise would have if you were unconscious], + [$<==>$ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had], [So, being alive is bad for you], [If you are unconscious when you are dead, then being dead isn't bad for you], - [If being alive is bad for you, then: if being dead isn't bad for you, you should kill yourself], - [So, you should kill yourself], + [If being alive is bad for you, then: if being dead isn't bad for you, you should stop being alive], + [So, you should stop being alive], ) +In other words, KYS7 plainly states that you should kill yourself to stop being +alive. This is clearly a ridiculous conclusion and one we should not accept. In +order to reject this conclusion, we must reject KYS3, which is HD\*. All of the +other premises can be substantiated easily, as follows. + +KYS1 is trivial. KYS2 is true because you experience no pain when unconscious, +and we certainly experience pain at some point while conscious. So, we must +experience more pain while conscious than we otherwise would have (while +unconscious). + +KYS6 essentially just says that if being alive is bad and being dead is good, +then you should take action to stop being alive and start being dead. After +all, why continue doing something that is bad for you when the alternative not +bad for you? + +Clearly, our own avenue forward is to reject HD\* as our principle of hedonism. +Without HD\*, the #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] no longer stands, and +therefore the argument for FD2 fails. + += Possible objections + +One might attempt to object to KYS without rejecting HD\*. The only other +premises to object against are KYS1 and KYS2. In particular, one might raise +the concern that someone could be alive without ever being conscious (as an +objection to KYS1), and that someone may not experience any pain while +conscious (an objection to KYS2). + +These criticisms are not substantial enough for us to reject KYS. KYS1 brings +up a valid point, but being unconscious for the rest of your life is not really +substantially different from being dead. Regardless, we could modify our +argument to + #pagebreak() #[