update draft of paper 1

work/2024/mes-45/wiki-bios.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Wiki Bios
+
+## Wiki Bio 3
+
+Shirin Aliabadi 10 March 1973 -> 1 October 2018
+
+### biography
+
+- Born in Tehran, Iran
+- Mentored by older borther
+- Raised in rich environment until Iranian Revolution, went abroad to study art
+  history at University of Paris
+- Commuted between Paris and Tehran, although primarily based in Tehran
+- Exhibited worldwide
+- Art is part of several notable collections (Deutsche Bank in Germany, Bristol
+  City Museum and Art Gallery, Farjam Collection in Dubai)
+- Passed away in Tehran after battling cancer
+
+### artwork
+
+- Delves into conflicting influences on young urban Iranian women
+- Tension between traditional values, religious restrictions, pervasive impact
+  of globalized Western culture
+- Photographic series _Girls in Cars_, women riding in cars, ready to party
+    - Illustrates contradiction between Iranian restrictions and youthful women
+      who were engaging with Western style traditions
+- _Operation Supermarket_, criticized failed capitalism and consumerism
+    - Common household goods to question and critique societal values and
+      economic systems
+- _Miss Hybrid_ presents young Iranian women in unconventional and striking
+  ways, features women with bleached blonde hair, blue contacts, flawless
+  makeup, in contrast with traditional view of Muslim women.
+
+### bio
+
+Shirin Aliabadi was a contemporary Iranian artist. Born on March 10th, 1973 in
+Tehran, Iran, she was exposed to a rich environment of art and culture while
+growing up, until the Iranian Revolution left both of her parents jobless.
+However, they still managed to send her overseas where she obtained a degree in
+art history at the University of Paris.
+
+Aliabadi was primarily based in Tehran but frequently commuted to Paris. Her
+artwork spans both photographs and drawings and has been exhibited worldwide,
+including in collections in Germany, Dubai, and France. A prevalent theme in
+her artwork is the contrast between the traditional view held in the West of
+muslim women and the reality around her in Iran. Her most famous works, _Girls
+in Cars_, and _Miss Hybrid_, both portrayed Iranian women in unconventional
+ways that were in contradiction with the traditional culture and values muslim
+women are often associated with. Women were depicted with bleached blonde hair,
+flawless makeup, and heading to parties in cars. Aliabadi's artwork highlighted
+the social and cultural structures in Iranian society and the shifts happening
+alongside the proliferation of Western culture.
+
+Aliabadi passed away in 2018 at the age of 45 after battling cancer.

work/2024/phil-1/paper-1/main.typ

@@ -8,22 +8,36 @@
   bibliography: bibliography("refs.bib"),
 )
 
-#show: word-count.with(exclude: (heading, <wordcount-exclude>, table))
+#show: word-count.with(exclude: (
+  heading,
+  <wordcount-exclude>,
+  table,
+  figure,
+  footnote,
+))
+
+#set cite(style: "institute-of-electrical-and-electronics-engineers")
+#set text(fractions: true)
+#set table(inset: 8pt, align: center)
+
 
 #align(
   center,
-  table(
-    columns: (auto, auto),
-    [
-      Perm: A2V4847
-    ],
-    [
-      Word Count: #total-words
-      #footnote[
-        Figure computed programmatically during document compilation. Discounts
-        content in tables and the AI contribution statement.
-      ]<wordcount-exclude>
-    ],
+  pad(
+    x: 20%,
+    table(
+      columns: (1fr, 1fr),
+      [
+        Perm: A2V4847
+      ],
+      [
+        Word Count: #total-words
+        #footnote[
+          Figure computed programmatically during document compilation. Discounts
+          content in tables and the AI contribution statement.
+        ]
+      ],
+    ),
   ),
 )
 
@@ -31,11 +45,11 @@
 = Introduction
 
 The argument for Betting on God says that you should believe in God, regardless
-of other evidence, purely out of self-interest. In this paper, I challenge this
-argument by assessing the premise that believing in a particular God always
-guarantees the greatest expected utility.
+of other evidence, purely out of rational self-interest. In this paper, I
+challenge this argument by assessing the premise that believing in a particular
+God always guarantees the greatest expected utility.
 
-The author's argument for belief in God #cite(supplement: [p. 38],
+The author's argument for belief in God on #cite(supplement: [p. 38],
 <Korman2022-KORLFA>) goes as follows:
 
 #indented-argument(
@@ -46,21 +60,29 @@ The author's argument for belief in God #cite(supplement: [p. 38],
   [So, you should believe in God.],
 )
 
-BG1 should be uncontroversial. If you expect an action to bring you the most
-utility (i.e. be the most useful), it's rational to do it.
+BG1 should be uncontroversial. If you expect that an action will bring you the
+most utility (i.e. be the most useful), it's rational to choose to do it.
+
+// To justify BG2, the author uses a so-called "decision matrix" to compute the
+// expected utility of each combination of action and possible outcome. The
+// possible actions are placed on the rows, and the possible outcomes are placed
+// on the columns, except for the last column, which is the calculated expected
+// utility. At each intersection of a row and column, we place the utility gained
+// from that combination of action and outcome. The expected utility for a given
+// action is computed by multiplying the utility of each action-outcome pair in
+// that action's row by the probability of the corresponding outcome occurring,
+// and summing up all of those values.
 
 To justify BG2, the author uses a so-called "decision matrix" to compute the
-expected utility of each combination of action and possible outcome. The
-possible actions are placed on the rows, and the possible outcomes are placed
-on the columns, except for the last column, which is the calculated expected
-utility. At each intersection of a row and column, we place the utility we gain
-from that combination of action and outcome. The expected utility for a given
-action is computed by multiplying the utility of each action-outcome pair in
-that row by the probability of the corresponding outcome occurring, and summing
-up all of those values.
+expected utility of either belief or disbelief in God. Both possible actions
+are placed on the first column, and the possible outcomes (God existing or God
+not existing) are placed on the first row. The last column of the matrix
+represents the expected utility of the action in its corresponding row. At each
+intersection of action and outcome, we write the utility gained from that
+action-outcome combination.
 
 Here is the decision matrix the author proposes on #cite(supplement: [p. 38],
-<Korman2022-KORLFA>) which gives the expected utility for believing or not
+<Korman2022-KORLFA>) which gives the expected utilities for believing or not
 believing in God.
 
 #show table.cell.where(x: 0): strong
@@ -90,51 +112,59 @@ believing in God.
   ),
 )
 
-Note that the numerical utility values themselves have no meaning, and they are
-meant to be viewed relative to each other. Utility doesn't literally provide an
-empirical measure of "usefulness" or "happiness."
+Note that utility doesn't provide an empirical measure of "usefulness" or
+"happiness," and should be viewed as a relative measurement.
 
-We assign the various finite utilities as we see fit, based on how much each
-scenario benefits us. In the case where God does exist, and you believed in
-God, then you are rewarded with an eternal afterlife of bliss and pleasure in
-heaven. This reward is infinitely greater than any possible reward on earth, so
-it has a utility of $infinity$.
+We assign each action-outcome combination utilities as we see fit, based on how
+much each scenario benefits us. You'll see shortly that the exact values we set
+for the finite utilities don't matter when infinite utility is introduced.
 
-So, the expected utility for not believing is $0.5 times 1 + 0.5 times 3 = 2$,
-and the expected utility is $0.5 times infinity + 0.5 times 2 = infinity$. If,
-according to BG1, you should pick the option with greatest expected utility,
-clearly you should choose to believe in God, because the expected utility is
-$infinity$.
+In the specific case where God does exist, and you believed in God, you
+are rewarded with an eternal afterlife of bliss and pleasure in heaven. This
+reward is infinitely greater than any possible reward on earth, so it has a
+utility of $infinity$.
 
-The exact utilities don't matter much, since any finite utility you could gain
-for atheism cannot possibly be greater than the infinite expected utility of
-believing in God. Also, as the author points out on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>,
-supplement: [p. 40]), the exact probabilities don't matter either since
-multiplying them by $infinity$ still results in the expected utility of
+
+To calculate the expected utility of a given action, we first multiply the
+utility gained from each action-outcome combination in the action's row by the
+probability of the corresponding outcome occurring. We then sum up all of these
+values to obtain the final expected utility.
+
+So, the expected utility for disbelief is $0.5 times 1 + 0.5 times 3 = 2$, and
+the expected utility for belief is $0.5 times infinity + 0.5 times 2 =
+infinity$. If, according to BG1, you should pick the option with greatest
+expected utility, you should clearly choose to believe in God, because the
+expected utility is $infinity$.
+
+Also, as the author points out on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p.
+40]), the exact probabilities don't matter either since multiplying even the
+smallest percentage by $infinity$ still results in the expected utility of
 $infinity$.
 
 I will show that the Argument for Betting on God fails because BG2 fails. In
 section 2, I argue you cannot determine whether or not believing in God has the
 greatest expected utility because the decision matrix approach fails when
 possible outcomes involving infinitely negative utilities are introduced. In
-section 3, I address a possible response to this objection.
+section 3, I address a few possible responses to this objection.
 
 = Possibility of Infinite Suffering
 
-It is possible there are more gods than just the one that sends you to an
-eternal afterlife for believing? The author partially addresses this in
-#cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [pp. 43-44]), using the example of Zeus.
-Zeus will only reward those who believe in him with an eternal afterlife of
-pleasure. So, if you believe in the wrong god, you don't go to the afterlife.
-The author concludes either believing in Zeus or the Christian God still has
-expected utilities of $infinity$, while being an atheist does has a finite
-expected utility. Therefore, it is still preferable to believe in _some_ god
-that may grant you an eternal afterlife, although no argument is made for
-_which_ god.
+I propose that there is the possibility of more gods than just the Christian one that
+sends you to an eternal afterlife for believing. The author partially addresses
+this concern on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [pp. 43-44]), using the
+example of Zeus. Zeus will only reward those who believe in him specifically
+with an eternal afterlife. So, if you believe in the wrong god, you don't go to
+the afterlife. The author concludes believing in either Zeus or the Christian
+God still result in expected utilities of $infinity$, while being an atheist
+always has a finite expected utility. Therefore, you should still believe in
+_some_ god that could grant you an eternal afterlife, although no argument is
+made for _which_ god.
 
-However, this leaves out the possibility of gods who punish you for some
-reason. For instance, suppose there exists an _Evil God_ who sends anyone who
-believes in any god to hell for eternity, and does nothing to atheists.
+However, this leaves out the possibility of gods who instead punish you for
+eternity. For instance, suppose there exists an _Evil God_ who sends any theist
+to hell for eternity, and does nothing to atheists. That is, the Evil God will
+punish anyone who believes in _any_ god, including those who believe in the
+Evil God themselves.
 
 Let us modify our decision matrix to model an outcome where the Evil God
 exists.
@@ -151,7 +181,7 @@ exists.
       table.header(
         [],
         [Correct god exists ($33.3%$)],
-        [No god exists ($33.3%$)],
+        [No god or wrong god ($33.3%$)],
         [Evil God exists ($33.3%$)],
         [E.U.],
       ),
@@ -172,19 +202,18 @@ We've added the new option to our matrix. For the sake of argument, let's say
 each option has an equally likely outcome. Again, the exact probabilities don't
 really matter when we're multiplying them by infinity.
 
-The utilities are mostly the same as before. Not believing in any god and the
-Evil God existing is now the best case for the atheist since they avoided
-infinite suffering. However, the theist now faces the possibility of the worst
-case of all: eternal punishment for believing in the wrong god. If eternal
-bliss in heaven has a utility of $infinity$, then it follows that we should
-represent eternal punishment in hell with a utility of $-infinity$.
+The utilities are mostly the same as before. However, the theist now faces the
+possibility of the worst case of all: eternal punishment if the Evil God
+exists. If eternal bliss in heaven has a utility of $infinity$, then it follows
+that we should represent eternal punishment in hell with a utility of
+$-infinity$.
 
-There is a problem: how do we calculate the expected utility of believing in
-god? We have $0.333 times infinity + 0.333 times 1 + 0.333 times -infinity$.
-What is $infinity - infinity$? A naive answer might be 0, but infinity is not a
-number in the traditional sense. It makes no sense to add or subtract infinite
-values. For instance, try and subtract the total amount of integers
-($infinity$) from the total amount of real numbers (also $infinity$)
+Let us attempt to calculate the expected utility of believing in god using our
+usual method. We have $0.333 times infinity + 0.333 times 1 + 0.333 times
+-infinity$. What is $infinity - infinity$? A naive answer might be 0, but
+infinity is not a number in the traditional sense. It makes no sense to add or
+subtract infinite values. For instance, try and subtract the total amount of
+integers ($infinity$) from the total amount of real numbers (also $infinity$)
 #footnote[Famously, this infinity is "larger" than the infinite number of
 integers in the sense of cardinality (G. Cantor). But subtracting them still
 makes no mathematical or physical sense.]. Clearly, this notion is meaningless
@@ -197,13 +226,13 @@ Consider the following Indeterminate Utilities argument:
   title: "The Indeterminate Utilities argument",
   abbreviation: "IU",
   [If the expected utility of believing in god is undefined, then we
-    cannot compare the expected utilities of believing in god or not believing
+    cannot compare the expected utilities of believing in god and not believing
     in god.],
   [The expected utility of believing in god is undefined.],
-  [So, we cannot compare the expected utilities of believing in god or
+  [So, we cannot compare the expected utilities of believing in god and
     not believing in god.
   ],
-  [If we cannot compare the expected utilities of believing in god or
+  [If we cannot compare the expected utilities of believing in god and
     not believing in god, then we cannot determine if believing in god has a
     higher expected utility than not believing in god.
   ],
@@ -247,26 +276,26 @@ utility, it is a false premise.
 
 One might argue that it is not plausible there is an Evil God who punishes all
 theists, including their own believers. Many religions present a god that
-rewards believers and at most punishes disbelievers. None of the major world
-religions propose an Evil God who punishes all believers. It's much more likely
-that a benevolent god exists than an evil one.
+rewards believers and at most punishes disbelievers, yet none of the major
+world religions propose an Evil God who punishes all believers
+indiscriminately. It's much more likely that a benevolent god exists than an
+evil one.
 
-I contend that it doesn't matter whether or not the Evil God is less plausible
-than a benevolent god. Surely, if a rational atheist who is unconvinced by all
-the world's scriptures can still concede that there is at least a non-zero
-chance that some god exists, the rational theist should also concede that there
-is a non-zero chance that the Evil God exists. All it takes is that non-zero
-chance, no matter how small, because multiplying it by $-infinity$ still
-results in the undefined expected utility.
+Notice that it doesn't actually matter how plausible the Evil God is. If a
+rational atheist should concede there is at least a non-zero chance some god
+exists, then there must also be a non-zero chance the Evil God exists. After
+all, can you say for sure that the Evil God doesn't exist? All it takes is that
+non-zero chance, no matter how small, because multiplying it by $-infinity$
+still results in the undefined expected utility.
 
 == Finite utilities
 
 One might argue that we can avoid using $infinity$ to ensure that all expected
-utility calculations are defined. Instead, suppose that the utility of going to
+utility calculations are defined. Instead, suppose the utility of going to
 heaven is just an immensely large finite number. The utility of going to hell
 is likewise a very negative number. All of our expected utility calculations
-will be defined, and given sufficiently large utilities, we should be able to
-make a similar argument for believing in god.
+will be defined, since infinity is not used. Given sufficiently large
+utilities, we should be able to make a similar argument for believing in god.
 
 // The problem with this argument is that we now open our expected utilities up to
 // individual subjective determination. A core feature of the previous argument
@@ -277,21 +306,24 @@ make a similar argument for believing in god.
 // well. This greatly complicates the decision matrix.
 
 The problem with this argument is that infinity has a special property the
-argument relies on. Namely, any number multiplied by $infinity$ is still
-$infinity$, so the exact probabilities we set for the existence of God don't
-matter. This is important for defending against the objection the author
-mentions on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p. 40]), that the
-probabilities are possibly incorrect, since the numbers don't matter anyways.
+argument relies on that no finite numbers have. Namely, any number multiplied
+by $infinity$ is still $infinity$, so the exact probabilities we set for the
+existence of God don't matter. This is important for defending against the
+objection that the probabilities are possibly incorrect which the author
+mentions on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p. 40]). If the exact
+numbers don't matter due to $infinity$, it doesn't matter if they might be
+wrong (as long as they are non-zero).
 
-If, instead, only finite utilities were used, then the theist must contend with
-the concern that the probabilities in the matrix are wrong. There could
-conceivably exist a matrix with probabilities for a benevolent god and an Evil
-God such that the expected utility of atheism is actually higher. The issue is
-we cannot say for sure what the probabilities of the benevolent god and the
-Evil God existing are. If we cannot know what the actual probabilities are,
-then we cannot know the final outcome of our matrix. So, without knowing the
-final outcome of the matrix, we still cannot determine whether or not believing
-in god has greater expected utility, and BG2 still fails.
+If, instead, only finite utilities were used, the concern that the
+probabilities in the matrix are wrong cannot be resolved with the same argument
+as before. There could conceivably exist a matrix with probabilities for a
+benevolent god and an Evil God such that the expected utility of atheism is
+actually higher. The issue is we cannot say for sure what the probabilities of
+the benevolent god and the Evil God existing are. If we cannot know what the
+actual probabilities are, then we cannot know the final outcome of our matrix.
+So, without knowing the final outcome of the matrix, we still cannot determine
+whether or not believing in god has greater expected utility, and BG2 still
+fails.
 
 #pagebreak()
 

work/2024/phil-1/paper-1/prelude.typ

@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-#set cite(style: "institute-of-electrical-and-electronics-engineers")
-#set text(fractions: true)
-
 #let indented-argument(title: "", abbreviation: "", ..args) = [
   #set par(first-line-indent: 0pt)
 
@@ -17,5 +14,3 @@
     ..args.pos(),
   )
 ]
-
-