.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
 result
-main.pdf

2024/documents/by-course/as-am-5/midterm-cheatsheet/package.nix

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-{
-  pkgs,
-  typstPackagesCache,
-  typixLib,
-  cleanTypstSource,
-  ...
-}:
-let
-  src = cleanTypstSource ./.;
-  commonArgs = {
-    typstSource = "main.typ";
-
-    fontPaths = [
-      # Add paths to fonts here
-      # "${pkgs.roboto}/share/fonts/truetype"
-    ];
-
-    virtualPaths = [
-      # Add paths that must be locally accessible to typst here
-      # {
-      #   dest = "icons";
-      #   src = "${inputs.font-awesome}/svgs/regular";
-      # }
-    ];
-
-    XDG_CACHE_HOME = typstPackagesCache;
-  };
-
-in
-typixLib.buildTypstProject (
-  commonArgs
-  // {
-    inherit src;
-  }
-)

2024/documents/by-course/phil-1/paper-2/main.typ

@@ -43,13 +43,9 @@
 
 = Introduction
 
-The argument Against Fearing Death says that you should not fear being dead
-because it is not bad for you. In this paper, I reject this thesis by showing
-that the argument from hedonism with which the author supports their premises
-forces us to draw incorrect conclusions.
-
-The author states the argument against fearing death as follows on
-#cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p. 74]):
+The argument Against Fearing Death proposes the surprising thesis that you
+should not fear being dead because it is not bad for you. The author states it
+as follows on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p. 74]):
 
 #indented-argument(
   title: "Against Fearing Death",
@@ -61,125 +57,22 @@ The author states the argument against fearing death as follows on
   [ So, you should not fear death ],
 )
 
-First off, the author does not argue that you should not fear the _process_ of
-dying. A painful death is something to be rationally feared. The author only
-argues that _being dead_ itself is not bad. That is, you may fear the way by
-which you die, but you should not fear the state of being dead itself.
-Furthermore, if there was a high likelihood you may die painlessly, perhaps
-under anesthesia during a risky surgery, you should not fear that either, as
-you will painlessly transition from being alive to being dead, and there is
-nothing to fear about being dead.
-
-The author justifies FD1 by denying the only possibility of rejecting it, which
-is the notion that your consciousness continues after the death of your
-physical body, perhaps in an afterlife. He rejects this idea by arguing that
-you, the consciousness reading this, and your physical human body, are one and
-the same (i.e. they are _numerically equivalent_). So, if your physical human
-body biologically ceases to be conscious after death (which it does), then you
-also cease to be conscious when you die.
-
-Premise FD3 is the direct result of FD1 and FD2, so its validity is dependent
-entirely on FD1 and FD2. We've already shown why FD1 should be accepted. Let us
-first examine FD4 before returning to FD2.
-
-FD4 makes a lot of intuitive sense. Indeed, upon close inspection, there are no
-glaring issues. It is rational to fear something if and only if it is bad for
-you. Sure, you may fear things that are not bad for you, but these fears are
-_irrational_, you should try to resist them. The only things that it is
-rational to fear are things that are actually bad for you, such as burning your
-hand on a hot stove, or stubbing your toe.
-
-Finally, we return to premise FD2. This is perhaps the most questionable
-premise as it is not immediately clear why being unconscious implies that being
-dead is not bad.
-
-We first need a rigorous account of what exactly characterizes something as
-"bad." The author defines the following hedonist principle:
-
-#pad(
-  left: 16pt,
-  [ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in
-    more pain than you would otherwise have had ],
-)
-
-Then, he constructs the following #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] to support
-FD2.
-
-#indented-argument(
-  title: "The Argument from Hedonism",
-  abbreviation: "AH",
-  [
-    If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead doesn't result in more pain than you otherwise would have had
-  ],
-  [
-    Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had
-  ],
-  [
-    $<==>$ (FD2) So, if you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn't bad for you
-  ],
-)
-
-I've slightly modified the author's numberings to emphasize that the conclusion
-AH3 is equivalent to the premise FD2. That is, if the #smallcaps[Argument from
-Hedonism] holds, then FD2 must be true.
-
-We've shown that the author's argument for why you should not fear death is
-substantiated by what appear to be valid premises. I object in section 2 by
-arguing that we should _not_ accept the author's hedonist principle, and
-therefore should not accept premise FD2, because it leads us to the conclusion
-that we should kill ourselves. In section 3, I address various potential
-responses to my objection.
+To support premise FD2, the author argues
 
 = Don't kill yourself
 
-I will advance the argument that we should reject HD\* because its logical
-conclusion is that you should kill yourself. HD\* implies that being dead is
-not bad for you, but it also implies that _being alive_ is bad for you.
-
 #indented-argument(
   title: "Argument for Killing Yourself",
   abbreviation: "KYS",
-  [You are occasionally conscious when you are alive],
+  [You are conscious when you are alive],
+  [Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had],
   [If you are conscious, you experience more pain than you otherwise would have if you were unconscious],
-  [$<==>$ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had],
   [So, being alive is bad for you],
   [If you are unconscious when you are dead, then being dead isn't bad for you],
-  [If being alive is bad for you, then: if being dead isn't bad for you, you should stop being alive],
-  [So, you should stop being alive],
+  [If being alive is bad for you, then: if being dead isn't bad for you, you should kill yourself],
+  [So, you should kill yourself],
 )
 
-In other words, KYS7 plainly states that you should kill yourself to stop being
-alive. This is clearly a ridiculous conclusion and one we should not accept. In
-order to reject this conclusion, we must reject KYS3, which is HD\*. All of the
-other premises can be substantiated easily, as follows.
-
-KYS1 is trivial. KYS2 is true because you experience no pain when unconscious,
-and we certainly experience pain at some point while conscious. So, we must
-experience more pain while conscious than we otherwise would have (while
-unconscious).
-
-KYS6 essentially just says that if being alive is bad and being dead is good,
-then you should take action to stop being alive and start being dead. After
-all, why continue doing something that is bad for you when the alternative not
-bad for you?
-
-Clearly, our own avenue forward is to reject HD\* as our principle of hedonism.
-Without HD\*, the #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] no longer stands, and
-therefore the argument for FD2 fails.
-
-= Possible objections
-
-One might attempt to object to KYS without rejecting HD\*. The only other
-premises to object against are KYS1 and KYS2. In particular, one might raise
-the concern that someone could be alive without ever being conscious (as an
-objection to KYS1), and that someone may not experience any pain while
-conscious (an objection to KYS2).
-
-These criticisms are not substantial enough for us to reject KYS. KYS1 brings
-up a valid point, but being unconscious for the rest of your life is not really
-substantially different from being dead. Regardless, we could modify our
-argument to
-
 #pagebreak()
 
 #[