243 lines
10 KiB
Text
243 lines
10 KiB
Text
#import "@preview/unequivocal-ams:0.1.1": ams-article, theorem, proof
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#import "@preview/wordometer:0.1.3": word-count, total-words
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#import "prelude.typ": indented-argument
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#show: ams-article.with(
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title: [On the Argument Against Fearing Death],
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bibliography: bibliography("refs.bib"),
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)
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#show: word-count.with(exclude: (
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heading,
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<wordcount-exclude>,
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table,
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figure,
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footnote,
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))
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#set cite(style: "institute-of-electrical-and-electronics-engineers")
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#set text(fractions: true)
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#set table(inset: 8pt, align: center)
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#align(
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center,
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pad(
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x: 20%,
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table(
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columns: (1fr, 1fr),
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[
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Perm: A2V4847
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],
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[
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Word Count: #total-words
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],
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),
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),
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)
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= Introduction
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In _Against Fearing Death_, the author argues you should not fear being dead
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because it is not bad for you. In this paper, I reject this thesis by showing
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that the argument from hedonism the author relies on forces us to draw the
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absurd conclusion that being alive is worse than being dead.
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The author states the argument Against Fearing Death as follows on
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#cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p. 74]):
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#indented-argument(
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title: "Against Fearing Death",
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abbreviation: "FD",
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[ You cease to be conscious when you die ],
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[ If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead is not bad for you ],
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[ So, being dead is not bad for you ],
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[ If being dead is not bad for you, then you should not fear death ],
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[ So, you should not fear death ],
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)
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First off, the author does not argue that you should not fear the _process_ of
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dying. A painful death is something to be rationally feared. The author only
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argues that _being dead_ itself is not bad. That is, you may fear the way by
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which you die, but you should not fear the state of being dead itself.
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Furthermore, if there was a high likelihood you may die painlessly, perhaps
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under anesthesia during a risky surgery, you should not fear that either, as
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you will painlessly transition from being alive to being dead, and there is
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nothing to fear about being dead.
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The author justifies FD1 on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [pp. 79-82])
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by denying the only possibility of rejecting it, which is the notion that your
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consciousness continues after the death of your physical body (perhaps in an
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afterlife). He rejects this idea by arguing that you, the consciousness reading
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this, and your physical human body, are one and the same (i.e. they are
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_numerically equivalent_). So, if your physical human body ceases to be
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conscious after death (which it does), then you (the conscious being reading
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this) also cease to be conscious when you die.
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Premise FD3 is the direct conclusion of FD1 and FD2, so it depends on the
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validity of those premises. We've already shown why FD1 should be accepted. Let
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us first examine FD4 before taking a closer look at FD2.
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FD4 makes a lot of intuitive sense, and upon closer inspection, there are
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indeed no issues which arise. It is irrational to fear something if it is not
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bad for you (this does not imply everything bad for you should necessarily be
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feared). Sure, you _could_ fear things that are not bad for you, but as the
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author states on #cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [pp. 82-83]), these
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fears are _irrational_, and you should try to resist them. The only things you
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should fear are things that are actually bad for you, such as burning your hand
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on a hot stove, or stubbing your toe.
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Finally, we return to premise FD2. This is arguably the most dubious premise as
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it is not immediately clear why being unconscious implies that being dead is
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not bad.
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We first need a rigorous account of what exactly characterizes something as
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"bad." The author defines the following _hedonist principle_ on
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#cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p. 76]):
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#pad(
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left: 16pt,
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[ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in
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more pain than you would otherwise have had ],
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)
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Then, he constructs the following #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] to support
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FD2.
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#indented-argument(
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title: "The Argument from Hedonism",
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abbreviation: "AH",
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[
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If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead doesn't result in more pain than you otherwise would have had
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],
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[
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Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had
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],
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[
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$<==>$ (FD2) So, if you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn't bad for you
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],
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)
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I've slightly modified the author's numberings to emphasize that the conclusion
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AH3 is equivalent to the premise FD2. That is, if the #smallcaps[Argument from
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Hedonism] holds, then FD2 must also be true.
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We've shown that the author's argument for why you should not fear death is
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substantiated by what appear to be valid premises. I object in section 2 by
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arguing that we should _not_ accept the author's hedonist principle, and
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therefore should not accept premise FD2, because it leads us to the conclusion
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that we should kill ourselves. In section 3, I address various potential
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responses to my objection.
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= Don't kill yourself
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I advance the argument that we should reject HD\* because its logical
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conclusion is not only that being dead is not bad for you, but _being alive_ is
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actually bad for you. Accordingly, this implies that you should kill yourself
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to stop being alive because it is bad for you. Of course, this is wrong and we
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should not accept HD\*. Consider the following argument:
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#indented-argument(
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title: "Argument for Killing Yourself",
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abbreviation: "KYS",
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[You are occasionally conscious when you are alive],
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[If you are occasionally conscious, you will experience more pain than you otherwise would have if you were unconscious],
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[$<==>$ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had],
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[So, being alive is bad for you],
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[If you are unconscious when you are dead, then being dead isn't bad for you],
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[If being alive is bad for you, then: if being dead isn't bad for you, you should stop being alive],
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[So, you should stop being alive],
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)
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In other words, KYS7 states that you should find a way to kill yourself in
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order to stop being alive. This is an absurd conclusion we should not accept,
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and it indicates a serious error with one of our premise. Let us identify
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exactly which one went wrong.
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KYS1 is trivial (unless you are unconscious for the rest of your life, which
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for our purposes is essentially the same as death).
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KYS2 is true because you experience no pain when unconscious, and we certainly
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experience pain at some point while conscious. So, we must experience more pain
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while conscious than we otherwise would have (while unconscious).
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KYS5 is equivalent to our conclusion AH3 in the #smallcaps[Argument from
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Hedonism].
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KYS6 essentially just says that if being alive is bad and being dead is good,
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then you should take action to stop being alive and start being dead. After
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all, why continue doing something that is bad for you when the alternative is
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not bad for you?
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Clearly, our only option is to reject KYS3 (which is just HD\*) as our
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principle of hedonism. Without HD\*, the #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] no
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longer stands, and therefore the argument for FD2 fails.
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Note that we do not make a claim as to whether or not death is bad for you. We
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simply show the absurdity of an argument that relies on HD\*, which means the
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#smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] fails to justify the premise FD2. Without a
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clear justification for why we should accept the dubious claim in FD2, we can
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no longer claim that death is definitely not bad and should not be feared.
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// #let hdp = [HD$'$]
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//
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// Let us formulate a new hedonist principle, denoted #hdp.
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//
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// #pad(
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// left: 16pt,
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// [
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// (#hdp) Something is bad for you if and only if it prevents or hinders the achievement of your goals
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// ],
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// )
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//
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// We need to clarify what is meant by "goals". In this case, goals refers broadly
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// to all of the things someone needs to feel fulfilled. Someone may have a few
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// _fundamental goals_, such as to be fulfilled or to feel happy.
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//
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// Anything that works against these goals is bad. If someone seeks to be happy,
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// then feeling pain is bad for them because they no longer .
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//
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// The author's hypothetical case of #smallcaps[Unread Mail] shows that this
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// HD\*\* wrongfully characterizes some situations as bad, so we should prefer
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// HD\*.
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//
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// However, in my formulation #hdp, we do correctly identify that the situation in
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// #smallcaps[Unread Mail] is not bad. #hdp is essentially equivalent to HD\* is
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// most cases, but it successfully identifies that being alive is not bad for you.
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// Since being
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= Possible objections
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One might attempt to object to KYS without rejecting HD\*. The only other
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premises to reasonably object against are KYS1 and KYS2. In particular, one
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might raise the following concerns
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+ An objection to KYS1: someone could be alive without ever being conscious.
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+ An objection to KYS2: someone may not ever experience any pain while conscious.
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These criticisms are not really substantial enough for us to reject KYS. KYS1
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brings up a valid point, but being unconscious for the rest of your life is not
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really a better situation than being dead. Regardless, HD\* still implies that
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being conscious is bad while being in a _death-like state_ of permanent
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unconsciousness is not. The conclusion then becomes that you should either kill
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yourself or place yourself into a death-like state (perhaps a coma), which is
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just as absurd as before.
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One may argue from a hypothetical situation in which a human is somehow
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modified to be incapable of feeling pain (of any sort). In this situation, HD\*
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does not fail, as it does not imply being alive and conscious is worse than
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being dead, since being conscious and being dead both result in absolutely no
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pain.
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This case fails to present any challenge to our argument. Even though HD\* does
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not fail in the hypothetical, it clearly still fails _now_, as it still implies
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that being alive is bad for you, the person reading, who almost certainly does
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feel pain.
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#pagebreak()
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#[
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= AI Contribution Statement
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#quote[I did not use AI whatsoever in the writing of this paper.]
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]<wordcount-exclude>
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