189 lines
7.3 KiB
Text
189 lines
7.3 KiB
Text
#import "@preview/unequivocal-ams:0.1.1": ams-article, theorem, proof
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#import "@preview/wordometer:0.1.3": word-count, total-words
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#import "prelude.typ": indented-argument
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#show: ams-article.with(
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title: [On the Argument Against Fearing Death],
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bibliography: bibliography("refs.bib"),
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)
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#show: word-count.with(exclude: (
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heading,
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<wordcount-exclude>,
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table,
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figure,
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footnote,
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))
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#set cite(style: "institute-of-electrical-and-electronics-engineers")
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#set text(fractions: true)
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#set table(inset: 8pt, align: center)
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#align(
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center,
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pad(
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x: 20%,
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table(
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columns: (1fr, 1fr),
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[
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Perm: A2V4847
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],
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[
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Word Count: #total-words
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#footnote[
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Figure computed programmatically during document compilation. Discounts
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content in tables and the AI contribution statement.
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]
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],
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),
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),
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)
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= Introduction
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The argument Against Fearing Death says that you should not fear being dead
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because it is not bad for you. In this paper, I reject this thesis by showing
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that the argument from hedonism with which the author supports their premises
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forces us to draw incorrect conclusions.
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The author states the argument against fearing death as follows on
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#cite(<Korman2022-KORLFA>, supplement: [p. 74]):
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#indented-argument(
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title: "Against Fearing Death",
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abbreviation: "FD",
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[ You cease to be conscious when you die ],
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[ If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead is not bad for you ],
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[ So, being dead is not bad for you ],
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[ If being dead is not bad for you, then you should not fear death ],
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[ So, you should not fear death ],
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)
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First off, the author does not argue that you should not fear the _process_ of
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dying. A painful death is something to be rationally feared. The author only
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argues that _being dead_ itself is not bad. That is, you may fear the way by
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which you die, but you should not fear the state of being dead itself.
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Furthermore, if there was a high likelihood you may die painlessly, perhaps
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under anesthesia during a risky surgery, you should not fear that either, as
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you will painlessly transition from being alive to being dead, and there is
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nothing to fear about being dead.
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The author justifies FD1 by denying the only possibility of rejecting it, which
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is the notion that your consciousness continues after the death of your
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physical body, perhaps in an afterlife. He rejects this idea by arguing that
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you, the consciousness reading this, and your physical human body, are one and
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the same (i.e. they are _numerically equivalent_). So, if your physical human
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body biologically ceases to be conscious after death (which it does), then you
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also cease to be conscious when you die.
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Premise FD3 is the direct result of FD1 and FD2, so its validity is dependent
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entirely on FD1 and FD2. We've already shown why FD1 should be accepted. Let us
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first examine FD4 before returning to FD2.
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FD4 makes a lot of intuitive sense. Indeed, upon close inspection, there are no
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glaring issues. It is rational to fear something if and only if it is bad for
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you. Sure, you may fear things that are not bad for you, but these fears are
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_irrational_, you should try to resist them. The only things that it is
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rational to fear are things that are actually bad for you, such as burning your
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hand on a hot stove, or stubbing your toe.
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Finally, we return to premise FD2. This is perhaps the most questionable
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premise as it is not immediately clear why being unconscious implies that being
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dead is not bad.
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We first need a rigorous account of what exactly characterizes something as
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"bad." The author defines the following hedonist principle:
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#pad(
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left: 16pt,
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[ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in
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more pain than you would otherwise have had ],
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)
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Then, he constructs the following #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] to support
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FD2.
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#indented-argument(
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title: "The Argument from Hedonism",
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abbreviation: "AH",
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[
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If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead doesn't result in more pain than you otherwise would have had
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],
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[
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Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had
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],
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[
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$<==>$ (FD2) So, if you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead isn't bad for you
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],
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)
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I've slightly modified the author's numberings to emphasize that the conclusion
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AH3 is equivalent to the premise FD2. That is, if the #smallcaps[Argument from
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Hedonism] holds, then FD2 must be true.
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We've shown that the author's argument for why you should not fear death is
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substantiated by what appear to be valid premises. I object in section 2 by
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arguing that we should _not_ accept the author's hedonist principle, and
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therefore should not accept premise FD2, because it leads us to the conclusion
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that we should kill ourselves. In section 3, I address various potential
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responses to my objection.
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= Don't kill yourself
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I will advance the argument that we should reject HD\* because its logical
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conclusion is that you should kill yourself. HD\* implies that being dead is
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not bad for you, but it also implies that _being alive_ is bad for you.
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#indented-argument(
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title: "Argument for Killing Yourself",
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abbreviation: "KYS",
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[You are occasionally conscious when you are alive],
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[If you are conscious, you experience more pain than you otherwise would have if you were unconscious],
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[$<==>$ (HD\*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you otherwise would have had],
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[So, being alive is bad for you],
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[If you are unconscious when you are dead, then being dead isn't bad for you],
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[If being alive is bad for you, then: if being dead isn't bad for you, you should stop being alive],
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[So, you should stop being alive],
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)
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In other words, KYS7 plainly states that you should kill yourself to stop being
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alive. This is clearly a ridiculous conclusion and one we should not accept. In
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order to reject this conclusion, we must reject KYS3, which is HD\*. All of the
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other premises can be substantiated easily, as follows.
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KYS1 is trivial. KYS2 is true because you experience no pain when unconscious,
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and we certainly experience pain at some point while conscious. So, we must
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experience more pain while conscious than we otherwise would have (while
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unconscious).
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KYS6 essentially just says that if being alive is bad and being dead is good,
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then you should take action to stop being alive and start being dead. After
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all, why continue doing something that is bad for you when the alternative not
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bad for you?
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Clearly, our own avenue forward is to reject HD\* as our principle of hedonism.
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Without HD\*, the #smallcaps[Argument from Hedonism] no longer stands, and
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therefore the argument for FD2 fails.
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= Possible objections
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One might attempt to object to KYS without rejecting HD\*. The only other
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premises to object against are KYS1 and KYS2. In particular, one might raise
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the concern that someone could be alive without ever being conscious (as an
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objection to KYS1), and that someone may not experience any pain while
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conscious (an objection to KYS2).
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These criticisms are not substantial enough for us to reject KYS. KYS1 brings
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up a valid point, but being unconscious for the rest of your life is not really
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substantially different from being dead. Regardless, we could modify our
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argument to
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#pagebreak()
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#[
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= AI Contribution Statement
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#quote[I did not use AI whatsoever in the writing of this paper.]
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]<wordcount-exclude>
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